In 1994, Henry Kissinger published the book Diplomacy. He was a renowned scholar and diplomat who served as the United States National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. His book provides an extensive sweep of the history of foreign affairs and the art of diplomacy, with a particular focus on the 20th century and the Western World. Kissinger, known for his alignment with the realist school of international relations, inquires into the concepts of the balance of power, raison d’État, and Realpolitik across different eras.
His work has been widely praised for its scope and intricate detail. Yet, it has also faced criticism for its focus on individuals over structural forces, and for presenting a reductive view of history. Also, critics have also pointed out that the book focuses excessively on Kissinger’s individual role in events, potentially overstating his impact. In any case, his ideas are worthy of consideration.
Below, you can find an overview of every chapter in the book, as well as links to more detailed summaries about each chapter:
Chapter 1 – The new world order
This chapter discusses the evolution of international relations and foreign policy, tracing how dominant nations have shaped global politics from the 17th century to the present. It highlights France, Great Britain, Austria, and Germany’s historical influences, and emphasizes the unique role of the United States in the 20th century, balancing its idealism with pragmatic diplomacy. American foreign policy is portrayed as torn between isolationism and global interventionism, advocating for democracy, free commerce, and international law while struggling with the concept of balance of power that is crucial in a multipolar world. The chapter also examines the different trajectories of Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and India, noting their impacts on the current and evolving global order. It concludes by reflecting on the complexities of forming a stable international system in a world with diverse historical experiences and the challenges faced by today’s leaders in reconciling these differences with modern realities.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 2 – The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson
This chapter discusses the evolution of American foreign policy from the early 20th century, highlighting the transition from isolationism to a more active global role, primarily under the influence of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt, recognizing the necessity of American involvement in international affairs for national interest and global balance, advocated for a pragmatic, power-based approach to foreign policy. He expanded the Monroe Doctrine and emphasized America’s right to intervene in the Western Hemisphere, aligning the country’s interests with global power dynamics. In contrast, Woodrow Wilson introduced a more idealistic approach, emphasizing the spread of American democratic values and moral principles in foreign policy. His leadership during World War I and the creation of the League of Nations marked a significant shift towards a policy of moral crusade and collective security, fundamentally changing America’s role in global affairs and setting the stage for its future international engagement. The chapter details how these differing philosophies shaped the development of American foreign policy, reflecting the nation’s struggle to reconcile its traditional values with the realities of becoming a world power.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 3 – From Universality to Equilibrium: Richelieu, William of Orange, and Pitt
This chapter discusses the evolution of the European balance-of-power system from the seventeenth century, highlighting the shift from a medieval universal world order to the fragmented state system that characterized modern Europe. It outlines the decline of the Holy Roman Empire’s authority amid rising national states like France, England, and Spain, which exploited religious and political rivalries to increase their sovereignty. The chapter details how the Habsburg dynasty’s control over the imperial crown and their acquisition of the Spanish crown nearly established a Central European empire, but the Reformation and subsequent weakening of the Papacy halted these ambitions. The concept of raison d’état and the balance of power emerged as guiding principles, with states like France, under Cardinal Richelieu, leading the way in prioritizing national interests over universal moral values. Richelieu’s strategic policies not only countered the Habsburgs’ Catholic dominance but also redefined European politics, fundamentally altering the landscape and leading to the prolonged Thirty Years’ War. The chapter concludes with the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the establishment of an international order at the Congress of Vienna, aiming to maintain peace through a balanced power structure combined with shared values.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 4 – The Concert of Europe: Great Britain, Austria, and Russia
This chapter discusses the significant diplomatic efforts at the Congress of Vienna following Napoleon’s first exile, focusing on the reconstruction of a stable Europe through the balance of power principle. Central figures like Austria’s Prince Metternich, Prussia’s Prince von Hardenberg, and England’s Lord Castlereagh played pivotal roles in shaping a new international order, emphasizing moral equilibrium and shared values among nations to prevent future conflicts. The chapter outlines the territorial redistributions that fortified Austria and Prussia and returned France to its pre-revolution borders, thus maintaining a delicate balance. It also highlights the formation of alliances like the Quadruple and Holy Alliances to deter French aggression and uphold conservative, monarchical principles across Europe. Metternich’s diplomatic strategies are portrayed as crucial in preserving this balance by moderating the ambitions of rising powers like Russia and maintaining a conservative unity among major European states, ultimately aiming to stabilize Central Europe and prevent the disruptions of revolutionary movements.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 5 – Two Revolutionaries: Napoleon III and Bismarck
This chapter discusses the transformative changes in European politics following the Crimean War, emphasizing the decline of the Metternich system and the rise of Realpolitik influenced by Napoleon III of France and Otto von Bismarck of Prussia. Both leaders, rejecting the conservative, royal-family-preserving principles of the old system, promoted policies focusing on national power and strategic interests. Napoleon III’s efforts to expand France’s influence by dismantling the Vienna settlement inadvertently facilitated the unification of Italy and Germany, weakening France’s position in Europe. In contrast, Bismarck’s calculated policies and manipulation of both domestic and international affairs successfully led to the unification of Germany under Prussian dominance, shifting the power dynamics in Europe. The chapter outlines their policies, strategic maneuvers, and the broader implications of their actions, highlighting the shift from a diplomacy based on legitimacy and balance to one dominated by the pragmatic and often ruthless pursuit of national interest.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 6 – Realpolitik Turns on Itself
This chapter discusses the concept of Realpolitik and its impact on the unification of Germany, focusing on the strategic and diplomatic shifts that occurred in Europe as a result. Realpolitik, aimed at pragmatism and power over ideology, ironically led to its own decline after unifying Germany, which emerged as a central European power. This shift disrupted the traditional balance maintained by peripheral powers like Great Britain, France, and Russia. Germany’s strategic central location spurred potential coalitions aimed at containing its power, ironically promoting the very tensions Realpolitik was meant to mitigate. This culminated in complex diplomatic situations involving France’s desire for revenge after 1870, the shifting focus of the Austro-Hungarian Empire towards the Balkans, and Russia’s evolving role from a marginal player to a key power by the 20th century. The narrative traces how these dynamics contributed to rising nationalism, the formation of precarious alliances, and set the stage for the catastrophic conflicts of the early 20th century, reflecting on the paradoxical outcomes of Realpolitik in European politics.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 7 – A Political Doomsday Machine: European Diplomacy Before the First World War
This chapter discusses the intricate prelude to World War I, focusing on the disintegration of the Concert of Europe and the subsequent formation of tense alliances that reflected a significant shift in European diplomacy from the 19th to the early 20th century. It highlights how major powers like Germany, Russia, and Britain evolved their foreign policies, often exacerbating tensions due to aggressive military posturing and a lack of foresight in the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The narrative explores the specific roles and diplomatic maneuvers of key figures and states, such as Kaiser Wilhelm II’s dismissive actions towards Russia and Bismarck’s successors’ failure to maintain his diplomatic subtlety, which led to Germany’s isolation. Furthermore, it delves into Russia’s expansionist policies in Europe and Asia, contrasting its aggressive stances with more restrained diplomatic efforts that could have averted conflict. The chapter illustrates how these historical dynamics set the stage for the catastrophic conflict of World War I, emphasizing the misjudgments and missed opportunities for peace that characterized European diplomacy during this period.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 8 – Into the Vortex: The Military Doomsday Machine
This chapter discusses the complex interplay of political alliances, military strategies, and diplomatic failures that precipitated the onset of World War I. It highlights the gradual shift from diplomatic crisis management to militaristic dominance, where the act of mobilization became synonymous with a declaration of war, particularly influenced by Russian and German military doctrines. The chapter details how military plans like Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, which emphasized rapid mobilization for a decisive victory, ultimately undermined any political maneuvering or diplomatic efforts, thereby making war inevitable. It critically examines the lack of foresight among European leaders, who failed to grasp the severe implications of their rigid military schedules and the fragile network of alliances that bound them. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand is portrayed as the spark in a tinderbox of geopolitical tensions, catalyzing a series of events that led to a full-scale war, which was then escalated by entrenched military plans and the absence of effective diplomatic communication, culminating in a catastrophic world conflict.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 9 – The New Face of Diplomacy: Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles
This chapter discusses the complexities and consequences of World War I, emphasizing the diplomatic shifts and evolving peace terms as the conflict progressed. It details the initial optimism surrounding the war’s potential brevity, quickly overshadowed by entrenched battles and massive casualties, leading to an increasingly hardened stance among the combatants, who sought complete victory over compromise. The narrative explores how the Allies, particularly influenced by American entry and President Wilson’s ideals, framed the conflict in moral terms, aiming for disarmament and democracy rather than traditional power balances. It recounts how the peace negotiations, especially at Versailles, attempted to reconcile these idealistic aims with the stark geopolitical realities of Europe, ultimately leading to a treaty that neither secured lasting peace nor satisfied any party involved. The chapter underscores the profound shifts in international relations introduced by the war, setting the stage for future conflicts and redefining the roles of major powers on the global stage.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 10 – The Dilemmas of the Victors
This chapter discusses the complex challenges and ideological shifts that occurred in the aftermath of World War I, particularly regarding the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty and the principles of collective security versus traditional alliances. The chapter outlines how the initial belief in collective security, heavily influenced by President Wilson’s ideals, faced practical challenges due to its broad and idealistic nature, leading to its ineffectiveness as nations like the U.S. leaned towards isolationism. It also examines the dynamics between France and Great Britain, highlighting their failure to form a strong alliance against Germany, which ultimately re-armed and challenged the Versailles restrictions. The chapter further explores the evolving role of the Soviet Union in international politics, initially aiming to promote global revolution, then shifting towards pragmatic diplomacy with agreements like the Rapallo Treaty with Germany. This shift, along with Germany’s strategic maneuvers and the failure of collective security, underscored the growing complexities and eventual breakdown of the post-war peace framework, setting the stage for future conflicts.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 11 – Stresemann and the Re-emergence of the Vanquished
This chapter discusses the complexities and dynamics of European diplomacy during the interwar period, focusing particularly on the roles of Gustav Stresemann, France, and Great Britain. Stresemann, as a central figure, advocated for a policy of “fulfillment” to abide by the Treaty of Versailles, aiming to restore Germany’s position in Europe through cooperation rather than confrontation. France, meanwhile, oscillated between enforcing the Treaty and seeking reconciliation with Germany, notably during the Ruhr occupation which ended in economic distress and diplomatic isolation for France. Great Britain’s role was marked by indecision, reflecting its public’s aversion to military engagement and its shifting focus towards collective security, which ultimately led to a lack of support for France. The chapter highlights the Locarno Treaties as a significant moment, where Germany recognized its western borders but not its eastern ones, setting the stage for future conflicts. The narrative reveals the inadequacy of the Versailles system and the League of Nations, culminating in the disarmament discussions that ignored the rising tide of nationalism and aggression, setting the stage for the eventual rise of the Nazi regime and the failure of interwar diplomacy to maintain lasting peace.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 12 – The End of Illusion: Hitler and the Destruction of Versailles
This chapter discusses Adolf Hitler’s rise to power, highlighting his charismatic oratory and ability to exploit political and psychological vulnerabilities to ascend in German politics. Hitler’s leadership was marked by impulsive decision-making and a chaotic policy approach, relying heavily on demagoguery rather than strategic planning. His early foreign policy victories were enabled by the appeasement and underestimation by other nations, though his aggressive ambitions eventually led to strategic blunders. The chapter further examines the initial global underresponse to Hitler, particularly the Western democracies’ inadequate actions in the face of his rearmament and expansion policies. The failure of the Stresa Front and other diplomatic efforts exemplified the international community’s lack of decisive action against Hitler’s violations of treaties, contributing significantly to the onset of World War II. It emphasizes that Hitler’s tenure not only led to immense suffering and destruction but also underscored the critical importance of recognizing and countering the threats posed by demagogic leaders through international cooperation and timely interventions.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 13 – Stalin’s Bazaar
This chapter discusses the intricate diplomatic maneuvers and pragmatic foreign policy approach of Joseph Stalin in the lead-up to World War II, contrasting his strategic flexibility with the more rigid and ideologically driven policies of Western democracies and Nazi Germany. It highlights how Stalin’s background in Bolshevik ideology and his view of himself as a “scientist of history” influenced his ability to form pragmatic alliances, even with ideological enemies like Nazi Germany, to further Soviet interests. Despite deep ideological differences, Stalin’s readiness to engage in Realpolitik allowed for the surprising Nazi-Soviet Pact, which was instrumental in reshaping European diplomacy and precipitated the outbreak of World War II. The chapter underscores Stalin’s strategic acumen in navigating between Western powers and Nazi Germany, maximizing Soviet gains and security without committing prematurely to either side, and how his calculated approach exploited the weaknesses and misjudgments of other nations, ultimately positioning the Soviet Union as a key player on the global stage.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 14 – The Nazi-Soviet Pact
This chapter discusses the complex and precarious interplay of diplomacy and military strategy between Hitler and Stalin on the eve of World War II. It explores their contrasting visions and tactics, where Hitler aimed for a racially purified empire and Stalin sought communist expansion, both using and manipulating traditional alliances and treaties for their revolutionary goals. The narrative traces the breakdown of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which once served mutual interests against Poland, leading to a massive conflict shaped significantly by the individual ambitions and decisions of these leaders. It also highlights critical diplomatic engagements, particularly through Molotov’s cautious yet confrontational negotiations in Berlin, which failed to deter Hitler’s planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Despite attempts at diplomacy and strategic positioning, including a non-aggression treaty with Japan to secure the eastern front, Stalin’s underestimation of Hitler’s impulsiveness and readiness for conflict led to a dramatic unpreparedness for the German invasion, setting the stage for a prolonged and devastating segment of the war.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 15 – America Re-enters the Arena: Franklin Delano Roosevelt
This chapter discusses Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s leadership during a critical period in American history, focusing on his shift of the United States from isolationism to a proactive role in World War II. It outlines Roosevelt’s strategies in navigating domestic and international challenges, from the initial reluctance to engage in global affairs to actively preparing and mobilizing the nation against the threats posed by the Axis powers. Through persuasive leadership and a vision for a post-war world, Roosevelt gradually influenced public and political opinion to support U.S. involvement in the war. This chapter highlights key diplomatic moves, legislative actions, and military preparations that marked the transition of the U.S. stance, culminating in active participation in the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt’s efforts not only redefined American foreign policy but also set the stage for the nation’s future global leadership role, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and democratic values.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 16 – Three Approaches to Peace: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in World War II
This chapter discusses the complex diplomatic strategies and visions for the post-war world held by Allied leaders during World War II, focusing on the ideological and strategic differences between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. It outlines how Roosevelt sought to avoid traditional European power politics in favor of a new global order based on mutual cooperation and led by the “Four Policemen” (the U.S., U.K., Soviet Union, and China), envisioning a post-war peace without reliance on American military power in Europe. In contrast, Churchill aimed to restore Europe’s balance of power to counter Soviet influence, while Stalin focused on expanding Soviet territories and creating buffer states against future threats. The chapter also touches on the pivotal battles and conferences that shaped these leaders’ policies and the subsequent Cold War dynamics, emphasizing the challenges of reconciling their vastly different goals and the lasting impact of their decisions on the geopolitical landscape.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 17 – The Beginning of the Cold War
This chapter discusses the complex transition of American leadership from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman at the close of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. Roosevelt’s death in 1945 occurred as the Allies were poised to defeat Nazi Germany, a pivotal wartime moment with significant implications for post-war Europe. Truman, less prepared and differently tempered than Roosevelt, inherited the presidency at this critical juncture. His administration navigated emerging geopolitical challenges, laying the groundwork for Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union, marked by ideological and strategic differences, particularly regarding the fate of Eastern Europe. The chapter also reflects on personal encounters with Truman, revealing his straightforward views on American democracy and foreign policy. As tensions with the Soviet Union intensified, Truman’s policies, including the Marshall Plan and diplomatic strategies at the Potsdam Conference, aimed to establish a new world order, but were challenged by Stalin’s unyielding stance and strategic manipulations, which foreshadowed the enduring East-West divide.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 18 – The Success and the Pain of Containment
This chapter discusses the establishment and evolution of America’s Cold War strategy, particularly focusing on the shift towards containment of Soviet expansion following World War II. In response to Soviet aggression and the spread of influence in Eastern Europe, the U.S., under President Truman and influenced by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” developed a foreign policy rooted in moral opposition to Soviet ideologies rather than traditional power politics. This strategy was characterized by efforts to support democracies threatened by communism, as evidenced by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which sought to rebuild and stabilize European economies. The chapter further explores the ideological framing of American foreign policy, which emphasized democratic principles and moral superiority, leading to the formation of NATO and the redefinition of American strategic alliances as principled rather than territorial. It also covers internal debates and criticisms of containment, highlighting divergent views on its moral and strategic implications, as well as the broader impact of these policies on American society and its role in the global order.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 19 – The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War
This chapter discusses the United States’ foreign policy shift during the early Cold War, particularly in response to the Korean War, which began unexpectedly in 1950 with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. Despite President Roosevelt’s earlier intentions to disengage from Europe after World War II, the U.S. instead increased its presence and established initiatives like the Marshall Plan and NATO to counter Soviet influence. The Korean War highlighted flawed assumptions in American military strategy, particularly the belief that the U.S. would not need to engage outside of Europe and that future conflicts would resemble those of World War II. The U.S. military response to North Korea’s aggression marked a significant policy shift from regional disengagement to active military involvement driven by an ideological commitment to oppose communism globally. This involvement was initially based on a misjudgment of Soviet and North Korean expectations of limited American response, similar to that in the Chinese communist takeover. The chapter details the complexities of Cold War dynamics, ideological battles, and the strategic missteps that led to an extensive military and ideological engagement in Korea, which had broader implications for U.S. foreign policy and its stance against the Soviet and Chinese influences.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 20 – Negotiating with the Communists: Adenauer, Churchill, and Eisenhower
This chapter discusses the complex diplomatic landscape of the early 1950s, centering on Stalin’s March 1952 “Peace Note on Germany,” which proposed discussions for a peace treaty with a unified, neutral Germany maintaining its own armed forces, against a backdrop of ongoing Cold War tensions. The chapter evaluates whether Stalin’s initiative was a genuine attempt to reshape European post-war alignment or a strategic maneuver to disrupt Western cohesion and delay Germany’s inclusion in NATO. Despite the potential for easing Cold War tensions, Western leaders, viewing the proposal with skepticism influenced by Stalin’s previous actions and the current geopolitical context, doubted its sincerity and feasibility. The chapter further explores the implications of Stalin’s death in 1953, which halted any progression of his diplomatic efforts, leaving his successors without the authority or unity to pursue meaningful negotiations. This period is depicted as a pivotal moment where strategic and ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the West were starkly highlighted, ultimately influencing the course of international relations in the subsequent decades.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 21 – Leapfrogging Containment: The Suez Crisis
This chapter discusses the Cold War dynamics following the 1955 Geneva Summit, emphasizing the shifting balance of power in the Middle East. It outlines how the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, continued their intense rivalry, particularly in regions like the Middle East. The chapter highlights significant events, such as the Soviet’s arms trade with Egypt, which increased Soviet influence in the region and challenged U.S. and British dominance. It also covers the strategic moves by the U.S. to maintain influence through the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, though these efforts faced challenges due to regional complexities and a lack of unified threat perception. The narrative delves into the United States’ and Britain’s failed strategies to align Middle Eastern nations with the West, including economic incentives and peace efforts with Israel, which were undermined by regional nationalistic sentiments and Cold War pressures. The chapter ultimately illustrates the intricate interplay of national interests, regional politics, and the Cold War rivalry that shaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East during this period.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 22 – Hungary: Upheaval in the Empire
This chapter discusses the significant events of 1956, namely the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian uprising, which marked a pivotal year in Cold War history and altered international relations. It explores the disillusionment of the Western Alliance during the Suez Crisis, the harsh suppression of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union, and the broader ideological and military standoffs indicative of Cold War tensions. The narrative details the longstanding Russian imperial ambitions, Soviet ideologies, and the economic and social impacts on Eastern European nations under communist control. It highlights the struggles within these states to maintain Soviet dominance while facing internal dissent and nationalistic movements, especially in Poland and Hungary. The chapter also examines the U.S. policy debates on how to address Soviet influence, the dual roles of entities like Radio Free Europe, and the limited effectiveness of U.S. interventionist rhetoric compared to the actual geopolitical actions. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the consequences of these events, the shifts in U.S. and Soviet strategies, and the ongoing challenges of the Cold War era, underscoring the complex dynamics and significant repercussions for the regions involved.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 23 – Khrushchev’s Ultimatum: The Berlin Crisis 1958–63
This chapter discusses the geopolitical dynamics of Berlin during the Cold War, particularly focusing on the complexities and strategies employed by the major powers involved. Following the Potsdam Conference, Berlin was divided into sectors controlled by the Allies, which set the stage for its unique and contested status. The city became a focal point for Cold War tensions, exemplified by the Soviet blockade and the subsequent Western airlift. The narrative elaborates on the role of key figures such as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who used Berlin’s vulnerability as a strategic pressure point, and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who resisted recognizing East Germany to maintain alignment with the West. The crisis tested alliances and strategies, as seen in the contrasting approaches of U.S. President Eisenhower, who emphasized diplomacy over military engagement, and French President Charles de Gaulle, who sought to strengthen France’s position in Europe. The chapter also touches on the broader implications of nuclear deterrence, the shifting U.S. policies under Kennedy, and the eventual easing of tensions that concluded with the recognition of East Germany in the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, setting the stage for future diplomatic resolutions.
Read our detailed summary of this chapter at this link.
Chapter 24 – Concepts of Western Unity: Macmillan, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Kennedy
This chapter discusses the geopolitical ramifications of the Berlin crisis and the resultant entrenchment of two distinct spheres of influence in Europe, shaping Cold War dynamics and NATO’s development. Initially, the Soviet Union, under Stalin, expanded its influence by transforming Eastern European countries into satellite states, which spurred Western democratic nations to fortify their alliances, leading to the establishment of NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany. The chapter details numerous failed attempts by both blocs to weaken each other, such as Stalin’s 1952 Peace Note and the U.S.’s plans under John Dulles. The narrative shifts to internal tensions within the Atlantic Alliance, notably differing approaches to nuclear strategy and Europe’s future between leaders like Britain’s Macmillan, France’s de Gaulle, and America’s Kennedy. Macmillan’s pragmatic diplomacy aimed to maintain strong ties with the U.S., while de Gaulle pursued greater European autonomy, challenging the philosophical underpinnings of Atlantic cooperation and pushing for a European security policy independent of U.S. influence. The chapter culminates in exploring de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe capable of standing independently from the U.S., shaping a unique European identity and security apparatus.
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