In 1994, Henry Kissinger published the book Diplomacy. He was a renowned scholar and diplomat who served as the United States National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. His book provides an extensive sweep of the history of foreign affairs and the art of diplomacy, with a particular focus on the 20th century and the Western World. Kissinger, known for his alignment with the realist school of international relations, inquires into the concepts of the balance of power, raison d’État, and Realpolitik across different eras.
His work has been widely praised for its scope and intricate detail. Yet, it has also faced criticism for its focus on individuals over structural forces, and for presenting a reductive view of history. Also, critics have also pointed out that the book focuses excessively on Kissinger’s individual role in events, potentially overstating his impact. In any case, his ideas are worthy of consideration.
This article presents a summary of Kissinger’s ideas in the thirty-first chapter of his book, called “The New World Order Reconsidered”.
You can find all available summaries of this book, or you can read the summary from the previous chapter of the book, by clicking these links.
This chapter begins by noting that the early 1990s seemed to mark a victory for Wilsonian idealism. With the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the ideological and geopolitical challenges that had defined the Cold War appeared to be overcome. Both President George H.W. Bush, envisioning a “partnership of nations” based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action through international organizations, and his successor, President Bill Clinton, expounding on “enlarging democracy,” articulated visions for a new world order rooted in Wilsonian principles: promoting democracy, the rule of law, and market economies. This was identified as the third instance in the 20th century where America aimed to reshape the world based on its domestic values, recalling similar ambitions after World War I, when Wilson overshadowed a dependent Europe, and after World War II, when Roosevelt and Truman seemed positioned to recast the globe on the American model.
Despite the pronouncements of a new world order, its final form was far from clear and would take time to emerge, its gestation period likely extending well into the next century. Any international system is defined by its basic units, their means of interacting, and the goals on behalf of which they interact. Historically, the lifespan of international systems has been shrinking: the Westphalian system lasted 150 years, the Vienna Congress system a hundred, and the Cold War order merely forty years, with the Versailles settlement being little more than an armistice. The post-Cold War era is highlighted as unique due to the unprecedentedly rapid, deep, and global changes in all these components. Periods of transition, where the nature of the international system’s constituent entities changes, are inevitably tumultuous. Examples cited include the Thirty Years’ War (feudalism to the state system based on raison d’état), the Napoleonic Wars (transition to the nation-state defined by common language and culture), and the 20th-century wars (caused by imperial disintegration and challenges to European dominance). The end of the Cold War brought a similar upheaval, with the proliferation of new nations—nearly a hundred since World War II, and another twenty from the Soviet and Yugoslav collapses, many of these new entities focused on re-enacting “century-old bloodlusts” and ancient ethnic rivalries rather than broader international order.
The chapter delves into the changing character of the “nation.” The 19th-century European nation-state, based on common language and culture, provided an optimal framework for security and growth given the technology of the time. This is contrasted with the diverse realities of the post-Cold War world where traditional European nation-states lack resources for a global role, their future influence dependent on the success of the European Union. At least three types of states calling themselves “nations” are identified: first, ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires, such as Yugoslav or Soviet successor states, obsessed by historic grievances and quests for identity, with international order often beyond their interest or imagination. Second, some postcolonial nations, many with borders representing the administrative convenience of imperial powers (e.g., French Africa segmented into seventeen units, the Belgian Congo governed as one despite its size). For these, the state often meant the army, its collapse leading to civil war; applying 19th-century nationhood standards or Wilsonian self-determination would cause radical, unpredictable realignments. Third, continental-type states, likely the basic units of the new order, such as India (a multiplicity of tongues and religions), China (a conglomerate of languages held by common culture and history), the United States (a distinct culture from a polyglot composition), and post-Soviet Russia (torn between disintegration and reimperialization, akin to 19th-century Habsburg and Ottoman empires). This diversification, coupled with instantaneous global communication where events are experienced simultaneously by leaders and publics, has radically altered the substance, method, and reach of international relations, which previously saw continents operate in isolation.
It is questioned whether Wilsonian concepts like “enlarging democracy” can be the sole guide for American foreign policy, replacing the Cold War strategy of containment. Positive achievements stemming from Wilsonian idealism are acknowledged—the Marshall Plan, the commitment to containing communism, defense of West European freedom, and even the League of Nations and United Nations. However, its shortcomings are also prominent: the uncritical espousal of ethnic self-determination in the Fourteen Points failed to account for power relationships and destabilizing rivalries; the League’s lack of military enforcement highlighted problems with collective security; the ineffectual Kellogg-Briand Pact showed the limits of legal restraints when faced with powers like Hitler’s Germany, where a loaded gun proved more potent than a legal brief. Idealistic crusades, such as Vietnam, also stemmed from this tradition. While the end of the Cold War created a “unipolar” world, America’s ability to unilaterally dictate the global agenda has not increased proportionally. Power has become more diffuse. Thus, America’s capacity to shape the world has actually decreased, making universal collective security harder to implement as nations, lacking an overriding common threat, do not view threats uniformly or show equal willingness to run risks. “Peacekeeping” (policing existing agreements) finds support, but “peacemaking” (suppressing actual challenges) is met with hesitation, as even the U.S. lacks a clear concept of what it will unilaterally resist.
The American exceptionalism underpinning Wilsonian foreign policy—the belief in America’s unrivaled virtue and power, enabling it to fight for its values globally—is contended to likely become less relevant. While U.S. military power will remain unmatched for the foreseeable future, its desire to project it into myriad small-scale conflicts (Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti) presents a conceptual challenge. Economically, while the U.S. will remain strong, wealth and technology for generating it will become more widespread, leading to unprecedented economic competition. America will be a “primus inter pares” but still a nation among others, a return to its pre-superpower status for most of its history. If Wilsonianism (collective security, converting competitors, legal adjudication, unqualified ethnic self-determination) is becoming less practicable, principles for America’s foreign policy might be found by looking to the era before Wilson. Concepts historically repugnant to Americans are discussed, such as raison d’état (state interests justifying means), which, despite American discomfort, has been practiced from the Founding Fathers’ dealings with European powers to “manifest destiny.” Another is the balance of power, a concept propagated by William III to check French expansion, requiring constant tending. American leaders will need to articulate a concept of national interest and how it’s served by maintaining balance in Europe and Asia, even if partners are not chosen solely on moral grounds. The post-Congress of Vienna system, which lasted longest without major war by combining legitimacy (shared values) and equilibrium (balance-of-power diplomacy), is pointed to as a model, suggesting Wilsonianism alone cannot be the basis for the post-Cold War era.
While the growth of democracy remains an American aspiration, obstacles are highlighted. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with long common histories, where society and nation often preceded the state. Political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus. In many other parts of the world, the state preceded the nation, and political parties reflect fixed communal identities, making the political process about domination rather than alternation in office; the concept of a loyal opposition rarely prevails. A realistic understanding of America’s reach and the importance of balancing moral commitments with available resources is stressed to avoid overextension and disillusionment from sweeping pronouncements unmatched by willingness to act. Foreign policy must begin with a definition of vital interests—changes so threatening to national security they must be resisted regardless of form. Both the Monroe Doctrine (too restrictive) and pure Wilsonianism (too vague and legalistic) are found inadequate for the current era, as shown by controversy around post-Cold War military actions.
Geopolitically, America is defined as an island off the Eurasian landmass, whose resources and population far exceed its own. A core strategic danger, Cold War or not, is the domination of either of Eurasia’s principal spheres (Europe or Asia) by a single power, as this could lead to that power outstripping the U.S. economically and militarily. This danger must be resisted even if the dominant power appears benevolent, for intentions can change.
The chapter then focuses extensively on Russia. American post-Cold War policy has been heavily influenced by the assumption that a democratic, market-oriented Russia will ensure peace, focusing on strengthening Russian reform. This approach is met with unease, as it may overestimate America’s ability to shape Russia’s internal evolution, risk needless involvement in internal Russian controversies, generate nationalist backlash, and neglect traditional foreign policy considerations. Russia, regardless of its internal system, occupies the geopolitical “heartland” and is heir to a potent imperial tradition. Even if a moral transformation occurs, it will take time, and America should hedge its bets. Economic aid, while important, will not have the same effect as the Marshall Plan in Europe due to vastly different underlying conditions in Russia (lack of functioning market systems, established bureaucracies, democratic traditions, or a unifying external threat). \
The American tendency to treat the anti-communist and anti-imperialist revolutions in the former Soviet space as a single phenomenon is critiqued. While anti-communism had broad support, anti-imperialist sentiment against Russian domination is popular in non-Russian republics but extremely unpopular in Russia, where leadership groups historically perceive a “civilizing” mission and refuse to accept the empire’s collapse, especially regarding Ukraine. A realistic policy would recognize that even Boris Yeltsin’s “reformist” government maintained Russian armies in most former Soviet republics, often against their wishes, and asserted a Russian monopoly on peacekeeping in the “near abroad,” akin to re-establishing domination. A policy is advocated that, while supporting Russian reform, also builds obstacles to Russian expansion and encourages Russia—for the first time in its history—to focus on developing its vast national territory. Staking everything on individual leaders like Gorbachev or Yeltsin, rather than permanent interests, is criticized, as it makes U.S. policy a victim of uncontrollable internal Russian politics and risks miscalibrating responses to every domestic quiver. A serious dialogue on converging and differing national interests is needed, as Russian leaders are capable of understanding such a calculus better than appeals to abstract utopianism. Integrating Russia requires balancing assistance with vigilance against the reappearance of historic imperial pretensions; the independence of new republics must not be tacitly downgraded.
American policy toward its Atlantic allies (NATO) has historically come closest to aligning moral and geopolitical objectives, serving to prevent Soviet domination of Europe. Surprise is expressed that victory in the Cold War has raised doubts about the future of this partnership. The decline in emphasis is attributed partly to it being taken for granted, a generational shift in American leadership with fewer emotional ties to Europe, American liberals feeling let down by allies practicing national interest over collective security (citing Bosnia and the Middle East), and the isolationist wing of American conservatism disdaining Europe’s perceived Machiavellianism. Despite disagreements, often like family squabbles, Europe has been a more cooperative partner on key issues (e.g., Bosnia, Gulf War) than any other region. Without Atlantic ties, America would be forced to conduct a pure Realpolitik, incompatible with its tradition. The task is to adapt NATO and the European Union (EU) to post-Cold War realities.
NATO remains the key institutional link, but its Cold War premise of defending against a Soviet threat has changed. The EU, initially a way to integrate a divided Germany and give Europe a unified voice, now faces a reunified, more powerful Germany, threatening the tacit Franco-German bargain (French political leadership for German economic preponderance). Traditional Atlantic relationships are predicted to change: Europe will feel less need for American protection and pursue its economic interests more aggressively; America will be less willing to sacrifice for European security and tempted by isolationism; Germany, under a new generation without personal recollection of WWII or America’s role in postwar rehabilitation, will assert greater political influence, less deferential to supranational institutions or American/French leadership. America’s continued organic involvement in Europe is argued as necessary, as existing European institutions alone cannot balance a strong Germany, nor can Europe manage a resurgent or disintegrating Russia without American partnership.
The perennial Franco-American debate within NATO (American integration vs. French European independence) is discussed, seen as a clash between Wilsonian ideals of underlying harmony and Richelieu’s concept of balancing interests. Events are argued to have overtaken this debate, with both NATO (for military security) and the EU (for stability in Central/Eastern Europe) being indispensable. Eastern European countries, especially the Visegrad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia), are asserted to need membership in both the EU (for economic/political viability) and NATO (for security) to avoid becoming a “no-man’s-land” between Germany and Russia. The then-current U.S. objection to NATO expansion for these countries, based on President Clinton’s argument against drawing new lines in Europe, is criticized. Clinton’s “Partnership for Peace” initiative is described as a vague collective security system that equates victims of Russian imperialism with perpetrators and is an alternative to, rather than a way station into, NATO, risking a strategic and conceptual no-man’s-land. A multi-layered approach is suggested: NATO for overall security and a common political framework; accelerated EU membership for former Eastern European satellites; and institutions like the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or a repurposed CSCE (perhaps renamed Partnership for Peace) to relate former Soviet republics, especially Russia, to the Atlantic structure, focusing on common tasks like economic development, education, and culture. The future of the Atlantic relationship, it’s concluded, lies in its decisive role in helping America cope with 21st-century global challenges (Russia, China, fundamentalist Islam), making “out of area” issues central.
Asia presents a different dynamic, resembling the 19th-century European balance-of-power system, with an emphasis on equilibrium and national interest. Wilsonianism has few adherents; there is no pretense of collective security or cooperation based on shared domestic values. Military expenditures are rising, and China is on a path to superpower status, which will significantly impact regional calculations. Other Asian nations are likely to seek counterweights. The U.S. role is likened to Great Britain’s in maintaining the European balance of power, requiring careful tending. America’s influence will depend on flexible engagement in Asian forums (like ASEAN and APEC, though Asian nations are wary of institutional frameworks giving superpowers too much voice) and, crucially, on its bilateral relations with major powers, especially Japan and China.
Japan’s Cold War subordination to Washington in foreign/security policy is unlikely to continue as regional powers like Korea and China strengthen, and as U.S.-Japan economic confrontations become common. Japan’s perspective on Asia differs due to proximity and history. Its defense budget has been rising, and Prime Minister Miyazawa’s firm “no” to a North Korean nuclear capability is indicative of a potentially more independent Japanese security policy. Close U.S.-Japan relations are vital for Japanese moderation and reassuring other Asian nations. A substantial U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea) is deemed necessary to lend credibility to America’s commitment and prevent Japan and China from pursuing purely national courses. Cultural differences in decision-making (U.S. status-based vs. Japanese consensus-based) also complicate the relationship, requiring greater American patience and Japanese willingness to discuss long-range policies.
China is seen as the most ascendant power. A policy of confrontation with China risks isolating America in Asia, as no Asian nation would support the U.S. in a conflict perceived as resulting from misguided American policy. China, with its long history of independent foreign policy and basing it on national interest, welcomes U.S. involvement as a counterweight to neighbors like Japan and Russia but resents American attempts to prescribe its domestic practices, viewed as humiliating given China’s historical experience with Western intervention since the Opium Wars. While advocating for human rights is part of America’s tradition, making all aspects of Sino-American relations conditional on them is counterproductive, making America appear unreliable and intrusive. The key to Sino-American relations, even on human rights, is argued to be tacit cooperation on global and Asian strategy, as China seeks a strategic relationship for regional balance. Good U.S.-China relations are also a prerequisite for good U.S.-Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, forming a critical triangle that parties abandon at great risk.
In the Western Hemisphere, a surprising confluence of moral and geopolitical aims is noted. After a history of U.S. interventionism (Monroe Doctrine), Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy marked a shift towards cooperation, later institutionalized in the Rio Treaty and OAS. President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress introduced economic cooperation. Starting in the mid-1980s, Latin America, previously dominated by authoritarian governments and state-controlled economies, moved with remarkable unanimity towards democracy and market economics. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (Bush) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada (concluded by Clinton) are highlighted as the most innovative American policies toward Latin America in history. The ultimate goal is a hemisphere-wide free-trade area from Alaska to Cape Horn, a concept once considered utopian. This, it is suggested, would give the Americas a commanding role globally. Here, American ideals and geopolitical objectives substantially mesh, in the region where its aspirations originated.
America’s dominant task in launching itself for the third time on creating a new world order is to strike a balance between the twin temptations inherent in its exceptionalism: the notion that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself. Indiscriminate involvement would drain a crusading America, while abdication would cede control to others. Criteria for selectivity are essential. The American tendency to prioritize motivation over structure and to believe in perpetual renewal, sometimes ignoring history (Santayana’s dictum), is critiqued. While American idealism is a strength, it must be tempered by an understanding that equilibrium is a fundamental precondition for pursuing its historic goals. The emerging international system is far more complex than any previously encountered, and foreign policy must be conducted by a political system that emphasizes the immediate and offers few incentives for the long range, with leaders addressing constituencies informed by visual images, putting a premium on emotion.
If a Wilsonian system based on universal legitimacy isn’t possible, America must learn to operate in a balance-of-power system. Two 19th-century models are contrasted: the British model, exemplified by Palmerston and Disraeli, involved waiting for direct threats to the balance before intervening, a difficult approach for America due to the required aloofness and ruthlessness. The other model was Bismarck’s later policy, which sought to proactively prevent challenges by building overlapping alliances and using influence to moderate claims, an approach seen as potentially more attuned to the traditional American method. America will likely need to build overlapping structures: some based on common political/economic principles (Western Hemisphere), some combining shared principles and security (Atlantic, Northeast Asia), and others largely on economic ties (Southeast Asia). America, for the first time in its history the strongest country yet unable to impose its will or fully withdraw, finds itself both all-powerful and totally vulnerable. It must not abandon its ideals but neither jeopardize its greatness by fostering illusions about its reach. World leadership is inherent in its power and values but doesn’t include pretending it does other nations a kindness by associating with them or has limitless capacity to impose its will by withholding favors. Any association with Realpolitik must account for core American values of liberty, yet survival and progress depend on making choices reflecting contemporary reality to avoid self-righteous posturing.
American idealism remains essential, but its role will be to provide faith through ambiguities of choice in an imperfect world. Traditional idealism must combine with a thoughtful assessment of contemporary realities to define usable American interests. Past efforts were inspired by utopian visions of a terminal point; henceforth, few such final outcomes are in prospect. Fulfillment will come through patient accumulation of partial successes. The certitudes of the Cold War are gone; the convictions needed are more abstract, involving a vision of a future that cannot be demonstrated when put forward. The Wilsonian goals of peace, stability, progress, and freedom will be sought in an endless journey, summed up by the Spanish proverb: “Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by walking.”
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