In 1994, Henry Kissinger published the book Diplomacy. He was a renowned scholar and diplomat who served as the United States National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. His book provides an extensive sweep of the history of foreign affairs and the art of diplomacy, with a particular focus on the 20th century and the Western World. Kissinger, known for his alignment with the realist school of international relations, inquires into the concepts of the balance of power, raison d’État, and Realpolitik across different eras.
His work has been widely praised for its scope and intricate detail. Yet, it has also faced criticism for its focus on individuals over structural forces, and for presenting a reductive view of history. Also, critics have also pointed out that the book focuses excessively on Kissinger’s individual role in events, potentially overstating his impact. In any case, his ideas are worthy of consideration.
This article presents a summary of Kissinger’s ideas in the twenty-seventh chapter of his book, called “Vietnam: The Extrication; Nixon”.
You can find all available summaries of this book, or you can read the summary from the previous chapter of the book, by clicking these links.
The Nixon Administration was tasked with leading the United States through its first major military withdrawal from an overseas conflict, a process that exposed deep divides between American ideals and political realities. Unlike France’s exit from Algeria, which required abandoning settlers, the American exit from Vietnam involved breaking a long-standing commitment four U.S. presidents had publicly framed as essential to global security. Nixon, therefore, faced the challenge of disengaging from Vietnam, a cause previously deemed critical, amid a sharply polarized domestic landscape.
The national consensus on Vietnam rapidly crumbled. In the mid-1960s, public support for a war seen as part of a global stand against communism was strong. However, by 1967, the conflict was increasingly viewed as a failure and a misguided venture. The intellectual and political communities that once praised John F. Kennedy’s progressive vision turned on his successor, Lyndon Johnson, whom they accused of perpetuating an unnecessary and brutal conflict. By the end of his presidency, Johnson was so unpopular that he limited his public appearances to secure environments, facing intense backlash even within his own party.
This unrest only intensified when Richard Nixon took office. He sought to negotiate a “honorable” withdrawal, intending to avoid simply abandoning South Vietnamese allies to the communists. However, the growing Peace Movement saw any notion of honor in the war as absurd. Protesters desired a full withdrawal, seeing it as a necessary step for the United States to confront its own flaws rather than imposing itself on others. This generation of activists questioned America’s role as a global enforcer and began to see the Vietnam conflict as a reflection of a morally questionable foreign policy. While Nixon viewed America’s role in supporting allies as essential to global stability, the Peace Movement saw it as an expression of hubris and misplaced interventionism.
The American public’s attitudes had shifted from the patriotism of the World War II era to skepticism and disillusionment. A generation raised with ideals of American exceptionalism now questioned whether the nation’s role as a “protector of free peoples” was justified or even achievable. For many, the brutality of the Vietnam War, broadcast on television, highlighted moral ambiguities that American leaders found difficult to address. A younger generation of Americans, raised in the idealism of the 1950s and 1960s, demanded a return to a moral high ground, finding America’s alliances and methods in Vietnam to be increasingly indefensible. Many antiwar advocates demanded absolute moral clarity, rejecting compromises that Nixon believed necessary to maintain U.S. credibility and honor.
Nixon struggled with the pressure to end the war decisively while grappling with a public increasingly critical of America’s role abroad. Unlike Johnson, who had little expertise in international affairs, Nixon was well-versed in foreign policy but found himself constrained by a domestic environment hostile to any form of compromise in Vietnam. He recognized that a victory in Vietnam was no longer feasible, but he sought a way to exit with minimal damage to America’s reputation. This ambition, however, collided with the demands of a younger generation that saw no value in Nixon’s version of an “honorable” exit, instead advocating for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
The antiwar protests deeply affected Nixon, who viewed the demonstrators not merely as political opponents but as ideological adversaries. He interpreted these public objections as part of a longstanding struggle against those he saw as undermining the nation’s goals and, in turn, himself personally. Nixon’s approach to diplomacy was sophisticated, but his domestic response was often combative. He perceived these protests as an attack on both his authority and the United States’ reputation, which further entrenched his belief that his critics misunderstood his intentions.
Attempts to bridge the divide failed, and Nixon received minimal support from establishment figures, many of whom had helped shape America’s Cold War policies and initially supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Key figures from prior administrations, such as Averell Harriman and Clark Clifford, held values aligned with Nixon’s, yet they withheld public support for his Vietnam strategy. These individuals had initially been vocal proponents of a U.S. global presence, and the emergence of the Peace Movement complicated their position, as protesters included people they considered allies in ideological terms. Many establishment figures, unwilling to fully endorse the methods of the Peace Movement, nonetheless found themselves in tacit agreement with its goals. This left Nixon isolated, with his attempts at consensus continuously undermined by his critics and former allies who indirectly aligned with the protests.
Nixon pursued what he called an “honorable peace” despite a lack of support from North Vietnam. Before even taking office, Nixon sent a message to North Vietnamese leaders signaling his desire for negotiations. Yet, Hanoi dismissed his offer and soon escalated hostilities, launching a new offensive that resulted in significant American casualties. Nixon’s hope of finding a compromise that could unite the American public proved futile against the unyielding demands of Hanoi, which insisted on a complete American withdrawal and the ousting of the South Vietnamese government, essentially demanding an unconditional surrender.
Nixon, confronted with the complexity of the conflict, reviewed potential strategies. The option of a unilateral withdrawal was quickly ruled out, as it was politically unsupported and could lead to disastrous military and diplomatic consequences. At that time, no major political faction in the U.S. endorsed a full, unconditional withdrawal without conditions for Hanoi. The Democratic platform called for a conditional de-escalation, while the Republicans advocated a strategy to gradually decrease American involvement. An immediate pullout would have left American forces exposed in hostile territory, causing chaos and potentially endangering those who remained. Nixon and his advisors feared this would result in a geopolitical disaster, severely undermining the U.S.’s credibility as a reliable ally and leading to instability within its global alliances.
In light of these obstacles, the Nixon Administration focused on a second approach: forcing a resolution through political and military pressure. This plan included congressional approval to sustain the conflict, extensive peace negotiations that conceded almost everything short of capitulation, and a revised military strategy to secure populated areas while disrupting North Vietnamese supply routes. Over time, the administration gradually implemented these measures—interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, targeting North Vietnamese bases, and mining harbors—all of which pressured Hanoi into accepting terms in 1972 that had been previously rejected. However, Nixon refrained from executing this aggressive approach all at once due to concerns about straining relations with the Soviet Union and China, inflaming domestic opposition, and risking his broader foreign policy goals.
Instead, Nixon pursued a third path known as “Vietnamization.” This approach aimed to balance American domestic support, bolster South Vietnam’s military capacity, and pressure Hanoi into negotiation. By gradually shifting the burden of the conflict to South Vietnam, Nixon sought to withdraw U.S. forces without appearing to abandon the cause. He committed to withdrawing troops while providing ongoing training and support to South Vietnamese forces, creating conditions under which Saigon could defend itself. Simultaneously, he intended to offer Hanoi diplomatic incentives for peace alongside occasional military actions as a warning against overreach.
This strategy, though complex and risky, attempted to address multiple challenges. Nixon recognized that each withdrawal strengthened Hanoi’s resolve while inciting further domestic protests. Any retaliatory strikes, meanwhile, intensified the antiwar movement. Vietnamization was a delicate balance that required sustaining American public confidence, empowering South Vietnam, and deterring North Vietnam, all without losing coherence.
In September 1969, a memorandum to Nixon, largely prepared by Anthony Lake, outlined the risks associated with Vietnamization. The document warned that a slow withdrawal might actually increase public impatience. It likened troop withdrawals to “salted peanuts” for the public; each return of soldiers would only spur demands for more, potentially pressuring the administration toward an unplanned, unilateral pullout. This scenario, according to the memo, could empower Hanoi by reinforcing their strategy of outlasting U.S. involvement. Despite these warnings, the memo lacked follow-through in Washington, where political strategies often require forceful advocacy to prompt action. Nixon ultimately maintained his course on Vietnamization, partly due to limited input from agencies that were demoralized by the domestic protests.
The harsh reality was that Nixon faced equally difficult choices, each with serious consequences. Vietnamization, while complex, seemed the most viable option. It allowed the U.S. public and South Vietnam to gradually prepare for American withdrawal while potentially strengthening South Vietnam’s position. Should unilateral withdrawal eventually become necessary, this phased approach would at least minimize chaos. Nixon aimed to negotiate peace while committing to this strategy, a task he entrusted to his adviser, despite knowing the negotiations would be arduous, especially given the intransigence of Hanoi’s lead negotiator, Le Duc Tho. Le Duc Tho saw the conflict as a zero-sum game, dismissing the notion of compromise and doubting South Vietnam’s ability to withstand his forces without significant U.S. support.
The rigid stance of Hanoi’s leaders, who perceived negotiations only as opportunities to impose their demands, confounded American diplomats. U.S. efforts at compromise were ineffective, as Hanoi focused solely on victory. Although North Vietnam occasionally entertained talks, it was only under pressure—particularly during American bombing campaigns. Domestically, however, these pressure tactics stirred even more antiwar sentiment in the U.S., amplifying the administration’s difficulties.
Negotiations with Hanoi proceeded on two fronts: formal talks, which included all parties in Paris, and secret discussions, which were limited to U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives. Formal meetings at the Hotel Majestic often became stalled by procedural issues and publicity, while the secret negotiations with Le Duc Tho, although private, were painstakingly slow. Hanoi’s approach was calculated to maintain psychological dominance, even arranging for the U.S. to initiate talks to highlight Washington’s eagerness for peace. Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, another North Vietnamese representative, meticulously followed Hanoi’s strict positions, reiterating that America’s only path to peace was a complete withdrawal and the dismantling of the Saigon government.
During each negotiation round, Le Duc Tho would reinforce his ideological stance and insist that Hanoi held the strategic advantage. He rejected American proposals for ceasefires or phased withdrawals, insisting on terms that would amount to an American concession of defeat. His unyielding approach often included elaborate explanations of Vietnam’s historic struggles for independence, conveying a sense of moral superiority. Even when negotiations were conducted in Marxist language for mutual understanding, Le Duc Tho seized any opportunity to reiterate his ideological disdain for America’s position.
Le Duc Tho’s tactic was to signal that Hanoi was content to let time work in its favor, leveraging America’s internal divisions to Hanoi’s advantage. By 1970, he had dismissed various peace proposals, including ceasefires and withdrawal timelines, as impractical, believing that America’s weakening resolve would ultimately lead to its capitulation.
During the next round of talks in 1971, Le Duc Tho used tactical maneuvers to pressure the Nixon Administration. While the National Liberation Front (NLF) presented a public seven-point peace plan, Le Duc Tho offered a different nine-point plan in private talks, stating this was the actual basis for negotiation. This tactic allowed Hanoi to publicly criticize the U.S. for not responding to a plan it wasn’t even willing to discuss seriously. Nixon eventually exposed this tactic, after which Hanoi replaced it with a vague “two-point elaboration” of the original seven points, which served only to create further public pressure on Nixon. In response to questions about the two-point plan’s meaning, Le Duc Tho later admitted it had no substance.
A breakthrough occurred in the final negotiation phase between 1972 and 1973 when Le Duc Tho finally dropped his insistence that the U.S. overthrow the South Vietnamese government, agreeing instead to a cease-fire. Although Le Duc Tho became more cooperative, he retained his difficult negotiating style. At one point, he quipped that, since the Americans hadn’t matched Hanoi’s “big effort” in negotiations, they now needed to make an even greater one.
For Le Duc Tho, the sole objective was achieving a communist victory, while the Nixon Administration had to balance a range of priorities, including America’s reputation and long-term global interests. The U.S. constantly had to defend its intentions against domestic accusations of insincerity, despite having made repeated unilateral concessions since Nixon took office, including troop withdrawals and political compromises that brought no reciprocation from Hanoi.
In the U.S., criticism from antiwar figures intensified. By late 1969, Nixon faced significant pressure from figures like Senator Charles Goodell, who introduced a resolution to withdraw all American forces by the end of 1970, and from mass antiwar protests nationwide. These demonstrations, embodied by the Peace Movement, turned the Vietnam War into a moral conflict for many Americans, shifting the goal from a negotiated peace to a rapid exit without regard for strategic consequences. Nixon’s reduction of troop levels from nearly 550,000 to 20,000 over three years and the decrease in casualties didn’t soften domestic opposition. While Nixon aimed to leave Vietnam honorably, the Peace Movement viewed any outcome short of a full and immediate exit as dishonorable.
Critics saw the Saigon government as an impediment to peace, viewing South Vietnam not as a key ally but as an embarrassment. Many advocated for a coalition government, disregarding that Hanoi defined a “coalition” as a vehicle for communist control. North Vietnamese leaders skillfully used vague language to present their proposals as reasonable, but closer inspection revealed plans designed to ensure communist dominance in South Vietnam, not genuine power-sharing.
Within the American political arena, some voices misunderstood or minimized Hanoi’s intentions. Senator Fulbright, for example, described the conflict as a rivalry between totalitarian powers, while Senator McGovern shifted from suggesting a “mixed government” in South Vietnam to advocating a full U.S. withdrawal and a halt in military aid. Nixon’s administration was willing to support free elections in South Vietnam, monitored internationally, but refused to undermine an ally for the sake of an expedited exit.
For the Peace Movement, the only measure of success was an end to the war, and if that didn’t seem imminent, America’s approach was assumed flawed. This perspective allowed Hanoi to maintain rigid demands without fear of criticism. By 1972, despite U.S. troop reductions, South Vietnam’s offer of elections, and a plan for complete U.S. withdrawal within months of a peace deal, the Peace Movement continued to question Nixon’s motives, viewing any extended negotiation as unjustifiable.
As the domestic debate in the United States intensified, antiwar activists increasingly advocated for a fixed withdrawal deadline, which they believed would secure a quick resolution. This notion became a focal point for antiwar Congressional resolutions, which numbered twenty-two in 1971 and thirty-five in 1972. Many in the Peace Movement felt that an established withdrawal date would lead to a prompt settlement of remaining issues, including the release of prisoners. However, Hanoi never promised such outcomes, maintaining its demand for a fixed withdrawal date alongside a U.S. commitment to remove the Saigon government. Hanoi viewed the conflict as one to be won by force, seeing American offers as opportunities to deepen American divisions rather than steps toward genuine negotiation.
This insistence on a fixed deadline marked a turning point. Nixon held firm in not committing to a date unless his conditions were met, although he ultimately agreed to a complete withdrawal upon achieving those goals. This decision left South Vietnam in a precarious position, forced to defend itself alone against a relentless enemy. Unlike other American allies, South Vietnam was left without a permanent U.S. troop presence, meaning the U.S. lacked a safeguard to enforce the peace agreement. In two significant speeches in 1972, Nixon outlined his terms: an internationally supervised ceasefire, prisoner return, continued aid to Saigon, and a free political process in South Vietnam. By October, Hanoi accepted these terms, agreeing to a ceasefire and the release of American prisoners, while allowing U.S. aid to continue without requiring the ouster of the South Vietnamese government.
This shift marked a breakthrough, achieved only after four difficult years. Hanoi’s acceptance followed a series of U.S. actions that weakened its position: harbor mining, strikes on Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries, the defeat of the North Vietnamese spring offensive, and limited support from Moscow and Beijing, especially after Nixon resumed bombing in the North. Hanoi likely anticipated that Nixon’s imminent electoral victory would strengthen his ability to prolong the war, a miscalculation. Nixon’s administration, however, knew the upcoming Congress was likely to cut war funding, making a peace agreement essential.
As peace became imminent, Nixon and his advisers hoped it would allow America to begin a process of national reconciliation, as the Peace Movement would see its goal achieved, while those seeking a dignified outcome could feel validated. In briefing on the agreement’s terms, Nixon’s advisers underscored the shared sacrifices and moral insights across both sides of the debate, expressing hope that this moment would foster healing both in Vietnam and within the United States.
The already fragile prospects for national unity around Vietnam further deteriorated due to Nixon’s actions in Cambodia. Since Nixon’s decision to intervene there was not inherited from previous administrations, it sparked intense partisan debates and added fuel to the antiwar movement. Critics charged that Nixon unnecessarily expanded the war by targeting North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, and some even held the U.S. accountable for the Khmer Rouge genocide that followed in Cambodia after 1975. However, North Vietnam had built a logistics network in Cambodia, using it to launch large-scale attacks against American and South Vietnamese forces. Nixon’s decision to bomb and launch ground attacks in these sanctuary areas aimed to safeguard the gradual withdrawal of American forces, which would have been otherwise jeopardized by an unchecked enemy presence so close to South Vietnam’s border. Cambodian leaders themselves saw these U.S. actions as a defense of their country’s neutrality.
The debate over Cambodia quickly became emblematic of the moral arguments against the Vietnam War, overshadowing military strategy considerations. American critics failed to fully grasp the ideological fanaticism of the Khmer Rouge, whose leaders were bent on a violent social revolution. The notion that U.S. actions turned the Khmer Rouge into mass murderers is as baseless as blaming American bombing for Nazi atrocities in World War II.
After the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973, there was little sense of triumph or relief. Protesters remained cynical, suspecting that Nixon’s insistence on “peace with honor” might signal a future return to overreaching foreign policies. Many argued that the agreement could have been reached years earlier and criticized Nixon for not securing the deal sooner, overlooking the fact that North Vietnam had consistently rejected U.S. terms until that point. Nixon proceeded with the agreement not to sway the upcoming election, in which he was already ahead, but to honor his commitment to a settlement once the agreed-upon conditions were met.
A common misconception is that Nixon unnecessarily prolonged the war for four years, despite being able to secure the same terms earlier. However, historical records show that the U.S. settled only when North Vietnam accepted terms that had previously been refused. Although the war officially ended in 1973, the controversy continued over America’s responsibility to enforce the peace agreement. Nixon and his administration understood the delicate nature of the settlement, knowing it might collapse without U.S. support. Despite ongoing political turmoil, the administration believed the agreement’s military and economic provisions could help South Vietnam remain stable if the North refrained from further incursions.
Nixon was open to encouraging North Vietnam’s integration into the international community through economic assistance, but he was also prepared to use air power if North Vietnam flagrantly violated the peace agreement, a stance the administration never ruled out publicly or privately.
After the war, the Nixon Administration anticipated the need to enforce the terms of the peace agreement, viewing it as their duty to uphold an accord for which so many Americans had sacrificed. Nixon made clear that significant violations would provoke a response from the U.S., yet he faced mounting challenges with Watergate eroding his authority. Despite evidence of North Vietnamese breaches—including increased troops in South Vietnam and continued supply operations through the Ho Chi Minh Trail—Congress rejected Nixon’s ability to enforce the agreement. By mid-1973, Congress cut all funding for American military operations in Southeast Asia, effectively undermining the possibility of a sustained U.S. role in upholding the peace.
Without U.S. support, South Vietnam’s position weakened. Congress reduced aid to South Vietnam each year after the agreement, and by 1975, even Cambodia was abandoned, just before falling to the Khmer Rouge. These decisions, intended by some in Congress to prevent further American entanglement, ironically led to the very bloodshed they had hoped to avoid, with genocides in Cambodia and severe repression in Vietnam. This tragic outcome reflected a failure to balance idealism with realistic support, leaving America morally conflicted about its involvement.
The ideological divide between those who viewed Vietnam as a moral commitment and those who saw it as an overreach persisted. Nixon’s overwhelming victory in 1972 reflected popular support for an honorable resolution, yet Congress later dismantled the foundations that would allow the U.S. to maintain peace terms in the region. This division, rooted in contrasting moral imperatives, continues to shape public discourse around the Vietnam War, with a focus more on assigning blame than understanding the complex outcomes.
The aftermath in Indochina confirmed some of the grim warnings that policymakers had issued about the risks of a communist takeover. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge inflicted mass atrocities, killing a large percentage of the population. In Vietnam, the new government sent hundreds of thousands into re-education camps and imprisoned political dissenters, with the National Liberation Front ultimately becoming little more than a puppet of Hanoi. Any notion of a truly independent, communist-led South Vietnam was quickly abandoned as Hanoi pursued reunification under Northern rule.
The fall of South Vietnam had broader global consequences. The perceived American collapse emboldened anti-Western movements worldwide, leading to Soviet and Cuban interventions in places like Angola and Ethiopia. The loss of Vietnam also raised the stakes for regional allies, who may have felt emboldened to resist communist expansion, as seen in Indonesia’s successful suppression of a communist coup in 1965. While the “domino effect” was limited geographically, the loss of South Vietnam reverberated far beyond Southeast Asia, influencing Cold War dynamics for years to come.
America’s involvement in Vietnam exacted a heavy toll, with losses far outweighing any potential gains. U.S. leaders applied European-style policies to Southeast Asia, overlooking the profound differences in culture, politics, and social structures. Guided by idealism, the U.S. underestimated the challenges of implementing democracy in Vietnam, a society influenced by Confucian traditions and engaged in a struggle for self-determination amid foreign intervention.
The Vietnam War fractured American society itself. Initially optimistic about transforming Vietnam into a democracy, American officials misinterpreted the political realities on the ground. When reality fell short of these idealistic goals, disillusionment set in, deepening domestic divisions. Policymakers, fully committed to decisions that they may have privately doubted, projected confidence that often masked a lack of clarity or misunderstanding of the situation.
The press and Congress have crucial roles in scrutinizing government actions, especially when misrepresentations occur. However, criticisms of the government’s “credibility gap” missed the broader point: the public and Congress were well aware of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam and had supported it through funding. While naïve, the intent to defend a newly established nation from a communist takeover did not warrant the fierce internal debate that eroded America’s core values.
Today, drawing constructive lessons from Vietnam requires bipartisan reflection. The U.S. should ensure it understands the nature of a threat and define achievable objectives before committing to conflict. Military action should aim decisively for victory, as prolonged stalemates exhaust public support. Additionally, American foreign policy needs a unified front; infighting leads to a lack of cohesion and undermines long-term goals. Nixon’s struggle to enforce his policy amid a divided Congress underscored that presidents cannot conduct foreign policy without legislative backing, especially in times of war.
Vietnam compelled the U.S. to confront its own limits. Unlike previous conflicts where moral clarity and material abundance bolstered American confidence, Vietnam’s ambiguous morality and limited impact of resources challenged America’s self-image. The war’s divisive legacy was a testament to America’s capacity for introspection, a willingness to risk social and political breakdown in pursuit of self-renewal.
In the end, the Vietnam experience taught valuable lessons that shaped future U.S. policy. After the war, America regained its confidence while the Soviet Union, which initially viewed America’s Vietnam failure as a sign of Western weakness, overextended itself globally and ultimately collapsed under the weight of its ambitions.
This history raises questions about the potential impact of American restraint. Could a passive U.S. stance have hastened the Soviet Union’s self-destruction without direct intervention? While an intriguing thought, such a strategy would be risky and morally uncertain, offering little comfort to those suffering under oppressive regimes.
America’s struggle in Vietnam ultimately highlighted its ethical concerns and sense of accountability. The U.S. regained its footing in the 1980s, and by the 1990s, nations again turned to America for guidance. Today, as memories of Vietnam remind the nation of its struggles, they also underscore the importance of unity, which remains essential both to American resilience and to the hopes of those who look to the U.S. as a global leader.
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